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The nominal value of a nation’s currency is determined, to 
varying degrees, in the currency market. Since 2005, 
China’s monetary regime has set the value of the Chinese 
Renminbi (RMB) rather than market forces. China’s 
monetary policy has inspired debate about whether China 
is adhering to International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
protocols,1,2 and whether China can be labeled a currency 
manipulator.3,4 Our analysis of this issue using real 
exchange rates provides additional evidence that China is 
undervaluing its currency, and thereby artificially 
inflating its net exports—to the benefit of US consumers 
but at the expense of the US trade deficit. 
There are two important 
measures of the exchange 
rate between two countries. 
The first is the nominal ex-
change rate, which measures 
the amount of one currency 
you can get in trade for an-
other currency (e.g. dollars 
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Our analysis of real exchange 
rates suggests that China is 
manipulating its currency. 
 
The consistently low value of 
China’s currency increases 
Chinese exports to the US and 
decreases the prices consumers 
pay for them.  
 
China manipulates its currency 
as a means to drive its 
predominantly export-oriented 
economy, contributing to their 
growth in the last decades. 
2 for euros) and is the rate you see posted at 
the currency exchange or in the newspaper. 
The second is the real exchange rate, which 
is a measure of the amount of one country’s 
goods you can get in exchange for another 
country’s goods, and is the metric of choice 
for our analysis. The real exchange rate is 
the nominal exchange rate adjusted for price 
level differences in the two countries. Due to 
constantly changing market conditions, both 
nominal and real exchange rates are usually 
volatile unless they are controlled.  
Our focus on the real exchange rate is criti-
cal and appropriate for this analysis because 
the real exchange rate drives the trade bal-
ance between countries. A twenty-one year 
time series of the real exchange rate be-
tween the United States and eight other 
countries, including China, can determine if 
China significantly deviates from a larger 
trend. If found, this could be grounds for la-
beling China as a currency manipulator. If 
China is manipulating its currency’s value to 
improve its trade balance, we would expect 
to see a fall in the real exchange rate that is 
correlated with a rise in China’s share of the 
US trade deficit.  
ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION 
To illustrate these comparisons, we first cal-
culate and normalize the price level ratio 
and nominal exchange rate data. With these 
data, we then calculate the real exchange 
rate between the United States and all the 
other countries we examined. The results of 
our analysis are shown in Figure 1, where 
the real exchange rates represent the price 
of US goods relative to the goods of each 
country.  
When the nominal exchange rate and price 
level ratio change congruently, the real ex-
change rate remains unchanged. On the oth-
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Figure 1: Real Exchange Rates Relative to the United States 
Source: Price data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), nominal exchange rate 
data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, plus authors’ calculations 
China starts setting the value of the 
Chinese Renminbi (RMB)
er hand, when the two variables diverge, the 
real exchange rates will show a correspond-
ing change. Our results indicate that the real 
exchange rate between China and the United 
States fluctuates far less than the real ex-
change rate between the United States and 
other countries. Additionally, these results 
suggest that China’s intervention into its ex-
change rate in 2005 was followed by a fall in 
the real exchange rate that is correlated with 
an increase in net exports to the United 
States. The data indicate that China’s inter-
vention into their currency valuation contin-
ues to result in the RMB showing a suspi-
cious lack of market sensitivity. 
Alternative explanations for falling real ex-
change rates, including falling Chinese infla-
tion rates or positive net foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) in China, do not adequately 
explain the results we have observed. Ac-
cording to World Bank inflation data for the 
past twenty years, China has had oscillating 
and overwhelmingly positive inflation rates. 
If the Chinese inflation rate exceeds the US 
inflation rate—and it usually has since 
2004—then the US-China real exchange rate 
should be rising.5 Yet, our results show this 
is not occurring, and a logical reason for this 
is that China’s purposeful depression of its 
currency is keeping the exchange rate from 
adjusting in response to the difference in 
inflation rates. According to the Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) data, net FDI into China has 
been positive since 2005, with outflows ex-
ceeding inflows only in 2016. FDI flows into 
China should appreciate its currency, and 
again this is not consistent with the real ex-
change rate derived in this analysis. The da-
ta show patterns that are consistent with 
Chinese currency manipulation. 
IMPLICATIONS 
Though it is important to keep in mind that 
China’s monetary policy impacts all of its 
trading partners, let us highlight how a de-
pressed real exchange rate affects the United 
States in particular. Figure 2 shows how as 
the US-China real exchange rate fell, China’s 
share of the US trade deficit rose. The degree 
of synchronization in this relationship 
demonstrates why China’s monetary regime 
is such a salient issue for the United States.  
How the United States should respond to 
China’s currency manipulation is not clear. 
Cheaper Chinese goods benefit US consum-
ers. Cheap Chinese imports hurt US produc-
ers, however, as they lose market share to 
foreign companies. If the US chooses to im-
The data show patterns that 
are consistent with Chinese 
currency manipulation 
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Figure 2: US-China Trade Balance and Real 
Exchange Rates 
Source: US trade balance data from the OECD, trade 
balance with China data from the US Census Bureau, 
plus authors’ calculations 
pose tariffs on goods benefiting from China’s 
monetary regime, it is not guaranteed that 
this problem would be fully addressed, be-
cause China could offset the increase in tar-
iffs with further currency changes. A poten-
tial policy solution to this issue is to offset 
the costs of US producers that are losing 
business; this can be done with something 
like a short-term adjustment stipend. It is 
not clear that taking direct action against 
China vis-a -vis the IMF or other internation-
al organization would benefit the United 
States in the long run, because domestic con-
sumers benefit from China’s artificially low 
prices.  
There is another question prompted by our 
analysis that could be answered with further 
study. Considering the emphasis China has 
placed on exporting as a means for econom-
ic growth, our study reinforces the notion 
that China’s economic ascent may be over-
stated. This would be even more apparent if 
further research can evaluate whether or 
not China is manipulating its exchange rate 
vis-a -vis its other major trading partners. 
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